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1 Introduction
Since Schumpeter (1934) a substantial theoretical and empirical literature has
emerged to analyse the process of new firm entry in developed economies (Jo-
vanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Dunn, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989; and Ericson and
Pakes 1995).1 However, while the significance of entry for developing economies
is recognized (Tybout, 2000), there has been little formal modeling of the issues
relating to entry in these economies, and of the associated problems posed by their
weaker institutional structures. In this paper we analyze the process of entry into
an entirely new industry in a developing economy, focusing on the impact for wel-
fare of regulatory intervention. Our model builds on the work of Hausmann and
Rodrik (2003), who explore how small open economies learn about what they are
good at producing. We find that the appropriate policy for enhancing entry rates
is more complex than simply to ensure the operation of ‘good institutions.’ The
factors inhibiting entry work in subtle ways, and, in particular, the interactions
between early and later entrants need to be taken into account.
Since de Soto (1990), it has been argued that regulatory entry barriers are a
major factor causing low entry rates in developing economies, with negative im-
plications for output and employment growth (see Roberts and Tybout, 1996, and
Tybout, 2000). Djankov et al. (2002) provide comparative data on the regulations
1 See also Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998).
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aﬀecting entry in 85 countries. These include the number of procedures required
to start a firm (which, between countries, varies from 2 to 21), the minimum time
for start up (from 2 to 152 days), and the oﬃcial cost (from 0.5% to 560% of
per capita GDP). The average costs of entry are found to be rather high in most
countries, and countries with heavier entry regulations are found to have larger
unoﬃcial economies and higher levels of corruption.
There is also evidence that entry regulations have a negative eﬀect on the rate
of formation of new enterprises. Scarpetta et al. (2002) find that the rate of entry
of small and medium enterprises is negatively related to the number of regulations,
especially those in the product and labour markets (see also Desai, Gompers and
Lerner, 2003). Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004) explore the impact on entry bar-
riers by looking at the interactions between country-specific and industry-specific
variables. The main country characteristic used in the regressions is the cost of
fulfilling bureaucratic requirements to register a company. They find that, for in-
dustries with high entry rates in the US, relative entry is disproportionately lower
in countries in which entry costs are higher. They conclude that entry regulations
do hinder entry, especially in industries that should ‘naturally’ have higher rates
of entry.
Our model addresses the initial level of entry by entrepreneurs into the new
industry in a developing economy and the steady-state solution obtaining after
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any subsequent entry or exit. We examine regulatory intervention in the forms
of a licence fee and of bureaucratic delay. Such interventions are not uniformly
damaging; for example, the imposition of a small licence fee is found to raise welfare
because it discourages entry. A delay between the application for a licence and
its receipt can increase the number of entrants, because of the strategic advantage
derived from early entry. After specifying the characteristics of a new industry in
Section 2, we go on in Section 3 to examine the benchmark case of socially optimal
pattern of entry and exit in a developing economy. In Section 4 we consider the
free-market solution with and without licence fees, the latter being denoted ‘laissez
faire.’ When the fee is zero, entry is found to be excessive because each entrant
ignores that its entry involves unnecessary duplication of sunk learning costs. Since
an entry barrier in the form of a licence fee has a negative eﬀect on both initial
entry and the steady-state number of firms, a suﬃciently small licence fee actually
raises welfare. However, because it is a single policy tool, it cannot induce both
socially optimal initial entry and the socially optimal steady-state number of firms
simultaneously. We also find that weaker property rights, if associated with greater
spillovers, can eventually lead to more entry and a higher level of production.
In Section 5 we introduce a time lag between the payment of a licence fee and
the granting of a licence. We show that, in equilibrium, entrepreneurs choose to
divide into three groups. One group pays the fee immediately, entering after the
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required lag, while a second group never buys the licence. Those in the third group
choose to ‘speculate’ on a licence, buying the licence early, before the profitability
of early entrants is revealed. Depending on the level of profitability that is later
revealed, some or all of the speculators may enter without further delay, while
any remaining speculators never enter. Interestingly, the option of speculation
causes entrepreneurs to eschew delaying the decision as to whether to purchase a
licence until profitability is revealed. Thus, our model provides a rationale for the
phenomenon of more licences being issued (even with a positive cost) than firms
entering. If the entry fee is small, the existence of delay raises the number of initial
entrants because of the strategic advantage they are given over later entrants. If
the entry fee is large enough, however, entry by first movers is discouraged. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Industry
We model the process of entry in a developing economy, whose characteristics are
described primarily in terms of factor supply constraints and institutional deficien-
cies relative to more developed economies. This is because we assume that, while
innovation in developing countries will typically be through the imitation of exist-
ing production methods in developed economies, such technology is not common
knowledge. Rather, the transfer of technology to new economic and institutional
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environments requires adaptations, and there is an associated uncertainty about
the future of profitability of the new ventures (see Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003).
Hence entrepreneurs set up firms in a particular ‘new’ industry, the profitability
of which is initially unknown.
We therefore consider a new modern-sector industry, with no incumbent firms
at time t = 0. Any entrepreneur may innovate, setting up a firm to enter the
industry and produce at t = 1. Though information on the supply of entrepre-
neurs is limited, studies of self-employment and latent entrepreneurship (see, e.g.,
Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer, 2001) do not suggest that entrepreneurship is
a function of income per capita (see also Casson et al., 2006). Thus, the supply of
potential entrepreneurs is assumed large relative to the number that actually set
up firms in the industry in equilibrium.2 Entrepreneurs (and firms) are indexed
i = 1, 2, ...
Entry by entrepreneur i at t = 1 requires a sunk cost k in learning and setting
up in the industry. As is common in developing economies (see Djankov et al.,
2002), it also requires the payment of a fee f ≥ 0 for a licence. If k and f are
incurred at t = 1, the firm will also need to employ a unit of skilled labour in any
2 At any time t there are more potential entrants than the market can sustain. The question
therefore arises of how the entry of only some of these potential entrants is co-ordinated. We
assume that there is some small exogenous asymmetry between potential entrants that allows
entry to take place only up to the point at which the present value of the expected profit stream
for the marginal entrant is zero. An alternative approach would be to model a mixed-strategy
equilibrium, but this would add complexity, and Levin and Peck (2003) have shown that this
approach can generate some rather implausible results.
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period t in order to produce. The output of any active firm i at time t is
yit = θ + βnt, β ≥ 0, t = 1, 2, ... (1)
At t = 1, θ is stochastic, being uniform over [0, 2Θ]; but, given that at least one
entrepreneur sinks the learning cost k at t = 1, the value of θ becomes common
knowledge at t = 2. In conjunction with the other parameter values, θ represents
the profitability of the industry in the country concerned. θ captures the idea
that, although the industry may exist in other countries, its suitability to local
conditions and institutions can only be discovered by experimentation. Note that
θ is not firm-specific. Unlike in Jovanovic (1982) or Ericson and Pakes (1995),
entrepreneurs do not learn about their own abilities; rather, they learn about their
environment.
Apart from θ at t = 1, the values of all variables and parameters in the model
are common knowledge. The total number of firms in the industry at t is denoted
by nt, and β is a parameter. The term βnt is included to allow for a network ex-
ternality, which is increasing in the number of firms in the industry. For simplicity,
output demand is assumed perfectly elastic. Output price is fixed at unity, and so
yt can also be interpreted as revenue.
In our model, the new industry is assumed to employ only skilled labour, and
we represent supply constraints by an increasing supply price. The wage for this
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labour, wt per unit at time t, is
wt = δ + αnt, δ, α > 0, t = 1, 2, ... (2)
For stability, we assume that α− β ≡ Ω > 0.
Any number of entrepreneurs can enter the industry at any time. For a first
mover (that is, an entrant at t = 1) θ is stochastic. Then, for a potential second
mover (that is, an entrant at t = 2) the value of θ is known. We assume, however,
that although the production function (1), including the value of θ, can be observed
by a second mover, methods of production can be only partially observed. A
second mover must therefore sink the learning/set-up cost (1 − γ)k, where 0 ≥
γ ≥ 1 is the spillover from the knowledge that a first mover acquires at t = 1.
These observations concerning second movers also apply to potential entrants at
t = 3, 4, ...
Since no information becomes available after θ is revealed at the beginning of
t = 2, there will be no reason for a firm to prefer to enter or exit in later periods,
rather than at the beginning of t = 2. Therefore, for t ≥ 3, nt = n2, yit = yi2, and
wt = w2. Writing πit and π
j
t for the respective profits at time t of a first mover i
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and a second mover j, we have
πi1 = θ − δ − Ωn1 − k − f ; πit = θ − δ − Ωn2, t = 2, 3, ...;
πj2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1− γ)k − f ; π
j
t = θ − δ − Ωn2, t = 3, 4, ... (3)
The present value, at t = 2, of first mover i’s profit stream, if it stays in production,
is
V i2 =
1
1− σ (θ − δ − Ωn2) , (4)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The present value, at t = 2, of second mover
j’s profit stream is
V j2 =
1
1− σ (θ − δ − Ωn2)−K, (5)
where
K ≡ (1− γ)k + f . (6)
In each case that follows, we examine the entry by first movers, the subsequent
pattern of entry and exit, and the steady-state number of firms n∗ in the industry,
which is the number of firms that enter, but do not exit (i.e., the number of firms
in the industry at t = 2, 3, ...).
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3 The Social Optimum
Since output demand is perfectly elastic, we measure social welfare by the expected
present value of the aggregate profit streamwhen the licence fee f set at zero. Since
there is no uncertainty after the value of θ is revealed (between t = 1 and t = 2),
the optimum number of firms is the same at t = 3, 4, ... as at t = 2. Hence, we
consider only the socially optimal values of n1 and n2, and we solve the model by
backward induction. At t = 2, n2 is chosen to maximize the present value V2 of
the aggregate profit stream, given the realization of θ. Taking this into account,
at t = 1, n1 is chosen to maximize the present value, V2, of the expected aggregate
profit stream.
At t = 2 the number of entrants n1 from t = 1 is given. Let n01 denote the
number of first movers (entrants at t = 1) that stay in production at t = 2, 3, ...
and let m2 denote the number of second movers (new entrants at t = 2). The
socially optimal behaviour at t = 2 depends on the realization of θ. From (4) and
(5), the present value, at t = 2, of the aggregate profit stream, with f = 0, is
n01V i2 +m2V
j
2 ≡ V2 =
1
1− σ (n
0
1 +m2) [θ − δ − Ω (n01 +m2)]− (1− γ)km2. (7)
At t = 2, n01 and m2 are chosen to maximize V2.
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From (7), dV2/dm2 for n01 = n1 is given by3
µ
dV2
dm2
¶
n01=n1
=
1
1− σ [θ − δ − 2Ω (n1 +m2)]− (1− γ)k. (8)
This is equal to zero, for zero entry m2 at t = 2, if
θ = δ + 2Ωn1 + (1− σ)(1− γ)k ≡ θ˜(n1). (9)
If θ > θ˜(n1), then V2 is raised by entry at t = 2. A positive value of m2 should be
set such that dV2/dm2 = 0 for n01 = n1; that is, from (8),
n2 = n1 +m2 =
1
2Ω [θ − δ − (1− σ)(1− γ)k] . (10)
However, if θ ≤ θ˜(n1), m2 should be zero: there should be no entry by second
movers. In this case we must consider how much exit, if any, there should be by
first movers.
Note from (7) that, setting m2 = 0 and then diﬀerentiating, dV2/dn01 = 0 if
θ = 2Ωn1 + δ ≡ θ0(n1). (11)
If θ ≥ θ0(n1), there will be no exit in the socially optimal solution. Hence, for
3 Throughout, we approximate by treating the number of firms as continuous.
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θ˜(n1) ≥ θ ≥ θ0(n1), the social optimal number of firms at t = 2 is n1. But if
θ < θ0(n1), there will be exit, and, provided θ ≥ δ, the number of survivors n01 will
satisfy (11); that is,
n01 =
θ − δ
2Ω ≡ n˜
0
1. (12)
In this case the amount of exit will be n1 − n˜01.
Finally, if θ < δ all n1 first movers will exit at t = 2, and there will be no
further entry.
We now derive the socially optimal entry of firms at t = 1, taking into account
what we have found about socially optimal behaviour at t = 2. Let V1 denote the
present value, at t = 1, of the aggregate expected profit stream, and assume, for
now, that θ˜(n1) < 2Θ. Then V1 can be split into four components. The first is
the aggregate profit earned in t = 1 by the n1 first movers, and the other three
components relate to expected profits at t = 2, 3, ...for each of the three ranges of
θ specified in the previous sub-section. Thus, we obtain
2ΘV1 = n1
Z 2Θ
0
(θ − δ − Ωn1 − k) dθ +Z 2Θ
θ˜
½
σ
1− σ [θ − δ − Ω (n1 +m2)] (n1 +m2)− σ(1− γ)km2
¾
dθ +
σn1
1− σ
Z θ˜
θ0
(θ − δ − Ωn1) dθ +
σn˜01
1− σ
Z θ0
δ
(θ − δ − Ωn˜01) dθ. (13)
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Let nopt1 denote the value of n1 at which dV1/dn1 = 0. From (13), it is found that
nopt1 =
Θ {Θ− δ − [1− σ(1− γ)] k}− σ(1− γ)k £3
4
δ + 1
2
(1− γ)(1− σ)k
¤£
2Θ+ 3
2
σ(1− γ)k
¤
Ω
. (14)
Since dV 21 /dn21 < 0, n1 = n
opt
1 is socially optimal. Note that n
opt
1 is increasing in Θ,
and decreasing in δ, k, and Ω, while dnopt1 /dσ and dn
opt
1 /dγ may take either sign.
We rest our analysis on the assumption that nopt1 > 0, that is, with a benevolent
social planner, the industry would be started. A necessary condition for this
inequality to hold is that, in (14),
Θ− δ − [1− σ(1− γ)] k > 0. (15)
This implies that in the range θ ∈ [0, 2Θ] the higher values yield a positive right-
hand side of (10). Also, it implies that θ˜(n1) < 2Θ, as we have already assumed,
the range covered by the second integral in (13) being positive.4 If the value of Θ
is reduced, the inequality θ˜(n1) < 2Θ is not violated because the value of nopt1 falls
suﬃciently quickly.
Figure 1 depicts this solution. The value of θ is shown on the horizontal
4 Setting n1 = n∗1, we obtain 2Θ − θ˜(n1) = (2Θ2 + z)/ [2Θ+ 3σ(1− γ)k/2], where z =
Θk [3σ(1− γ)/2 + γ]− σ(1− σ)k2(1− γ)2/4. Thus, suﬃcient for 2Θ− θ˜(n1) > 0 is that z ≥ 0,
i.e., Θ/k ≥
£
σ(1− σ)k2(1− γ)2/4
¤
/ [3σ(1− γ)/2 + γ]. But, from (14), given that n∗1 > 0, we
have that Θ−δ−[1− σ(1− γ)] k > 0, i.e., that Θ/k > 1−σ(1−γ). Combining these inequalities,
suﬃcient for 2Θ − θ˜(n1) > 0 is that 1 − σ(1 − γ) ≥
£
σ(1− σ)k2(1− γ)2/4
¤
/ [3σ(1− γ)/2 + γ],
which reduces to σ(1− γ) [3− (1− γ)(5σ − 1)/2] + 2γ[1− σ(1− γ)] ≥ 0. Since both terms [.] in
this inequality are positive, 2Θ− θ˜(n1) > 0.
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axis and the number of firms nt at time t on the vertical axis. The steady-state
number of firms in the social optimum, n∗opt, is shown by the thick line segments.
Of the two upward-sloping segments, the one on the left is n1 = (θ − δ)/2Ω, the
value n∗opt would take if sunk cost K were zero,5 and the one on the right is
n1 = [θ− δ − (1− σ)(1− γ)k]/2Ω, the value n∗opt would take if sunk cost K were
(1− σ)(1− γ)k. The vertical diﬀerence between n∗opt and nopt1 for a given value of
θ is the amount of entry or exit at t = 2.
[Figure 1]
4 Market Equilibrium
We now assume that entrepreneurs make decisions freely about whether to enter
or exit. In this section we assume that although a licence may be required, there
is no delay in receiving it.
We solve the model by backward induction, and, again, since the solution is
the same at t = 3, 4, ...as at t = 2, we begin with t = 2. We assume that parameter
values are such that there is positive entry at t = 1 in the solution.6
The value of n2 depends on the range of values within which θ falls. Four cases
5 Because at least one firm has to enter for our analysis to obtain, we start this line just above
the θ-axis.
6 As we shall see, this is implied by our assumption that nopt1 > 0. If all firms find it
unprofitable to enter at t = 1, they will also find it unprofitable at t = 2, and the industry will
not be established.
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can be distinguished.
Case (a) All n1 first movers would exit because even one of them alone in the
industry would make a loss at t = 2. From (3), this occurs if
θ < δ + Ω ≡ θa. (16)
If (16) holds, all first movers exit; and since second movers are at a cost disadvan-
tage relative to first movers (still having to incur a set-up cost), there are is no
entry by second movers.
Case (b) In this range θ ≥ θa, and so some of the n1 first movers remain in
the industry at t = 2, while some exit. If all n1 first movers were to remain in the
industry the n1-th would make a loss, i.e., from (3),
θ < δ + Ωn1 ≡ θb(n1). (17)
Thus, θ ∈ [θa, θb). Because, at t = 2, a potential second mover is at a cost
disadvantage relative to any first mover, there is no entry by second movers. The
number of firms n2 in this case is such that V i2 = 0, so that, from (4),
n2 =
θ − δ
Ω > 0 for θ ∈ (θa, θb]. (18)
Case (c) If θ ≥ θb all first movers remain in the industry at t = 2, but θ is not
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so great as to induce entry by second movers. From (5), V j2 is decreasing in n2.
Thus, if V j2 ≤ 0 for n2 = n1, there will be no second movers. This condition can
be written
θ ≤ δ + Ωn1 + (1− σ)K ≡ θc(n1). (19)
When θ ∈ [θb, θc), n2 is independent of parameter values.
Case (d) If θ ∈ (θc, 2Θ] the first movers will all remain in the industry at t = 2
and there will be entry by second movers until V j2 = 0. Hence, from (5),
n2 =
1
Ω [θ − δ − (1− σ)K] ≡ nˆ2. (20)
At t = 1 firm n1 is the marginal firm among those that enter. Writing πn1t for
its profit at time t, and taking into account the four cases for possible draws of θ,
the expected present value of this firm’s profit stream is
V n11 (n1) =
1
2Θ
½Z 2Θ
0
πn11 (n1)dθ +
σ
1− σ
·Z θc
θb
πn12 (n1)dθ +
Z 2Θ
θc
πn12 (nˆ2)dθ
¸¾
.
(21)
Here, the term in parentheses (.) after each πn1t denotes the number of firms in the
industry in the time period considered. The first integral covers profit at t = 1,
while the second and third integrals relate to profit at t = 2 in Cases (c) and (d)
respectively. (If Case (a) or (b) applied, firm n1 would exit, and so no term is
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specified.) πn11 (.) and πn12 (.) are given by (4), while nˆ2 is given by (20). Thus,
V n11 (n1) = (Θ− δ − Ωn1 − k − f)−
1
4Θσ(1− σ)K
2 + σK
µ
1− δ + Ωn1
2Θ
¶
. (22)
From (22), dV n11 (n1)/dn1 < 0. n1 adjusts such that, in equilibrium, V n11 (n1) =
0, the solution being n1 = nˆ1(f), where
nˆ1(f) =
2Θ− δ
Ω −
4Θ(Θ+ k + f) + σ(1− σ)K2
2Ω(2Θ+ σK) . (23)
From (20) and (23), we can find, for Case (d), how many second movers will enter.
Denoting this number by mˆ2(f) = nˆ2(f)− nˆ1(f), we obtain
mˆ2(f) =
4Θ(θ −Θ+ γk) + σK [2θ − (1− σ)K]
2Ω(2Θ+ σK) for θ ∈ (θc, 2Θ]. (24)
Let n∗m(f) denote the steady-state number of firms in the market solution for
licence fee f . Since by t = 2 all uncertainty is resolved, n∗m(f) = n2. The value
of n∗m(f) depends on which of cases (a)-(d) obtains.
The eﬀects of variation in parameter values on nˆ1(f) and n∗m(f) are easily
obtained. Since there are four cases of the latter, and, in general, the results
are intuitively as might be expected, for brevity, we do not discuss them.7 In
7 nˆ1 is increasing in σ and β, and decreasing in α, δ, γ, k and f . In case (a) n∗m = 0. In Case
(b) n∗m is increasing in β, decreasing in α and δ, and independent of σ, γ, k and f . In Case (c)
n∗m = nˆ1. In Case (d), n∗m is increasing in σ, β and γ, and decreasing in α, δ, k and f .
16
particular, dnˆ1(f)/df < 0 and, for n∗m(f) > 0, dn∗m(f)/df < 0, results that we
return to below. However, one other result is worth commenting on - the eﬀect of
variation in the spillover parameter γ. Using (6) and (20), we obtain the following
result.
Lemma 1 A higher value of the spillover parameter γ is associated with a smaller
entry of first movers, but, provided θ is high enough for second movers to enter,
this eﬀect is more than outweighed (after a one-period lag) by the greater entry of
second movers.
This has the interesting implication that, if weaker property rights are asso-
ciated with greater levels of spillover, they will cause a lower level of entry ini-
tially, but competitive pressures can lead eventually to more entry in total, with a
larger number of new firms and a higher level of output. Pressures in developing
economies to strengthen intellectual property rights, for example via the World
Trade Organization, in so far as they aﬀect the level of spillovers in the domestic
market, may have the perverse eﬀect of reducing the total number of firms and
production.
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4.1 Laissez Faire, Licences, and Sub-Optimality
Setting f = 0, we obtain the laissez-faire solution. From (23),
nˆ1(0) =
Θ {Θ− δ − [1− σ(1− γ)] k}− σ(1− γ)k £1
2
δ + 1
4
(1− γ)(1− σ)k
¤
[Θ+ σ(1− γ)k]Ω . (25)
Comparing (25) with (14), it is immediately see that nˆ1(0) exceeds nopt1 , the entry
at t = 1 in the social optimum.8
To compare the steady-state number of firms n∗m(f) for f = 0 with the social
optimum, we draw the diagram corresponding, for laissez faire, to Figure 1. This is
done in Figure 2, where the thick line depicts the laissez-faire case and the broken
line depicts the social optimum. Period-1 entry in the laissez-faire case is labelled
nm1 (0). From (10) (12), (18) and (20), the slopes of the upward sloping portions
of n∗m(0) are half the slopes of the corresponding portions for n∗opt. We cannot
tell, unconditionally, whether each discontinuity for the laissez-faire line n∗m(0) is
to the left or right of of the corresponding discontinuity for the social optimum
n∗opt; but the critical features of the figure are that, for each line, for one firm to
stay in the industry we must have θ = δ + Ω, while for any θ greater than this,
n∗m(0) > n∗opt.
[Figure 2]
8 From (25) and (14), if k = 0 laissez faire results in social optimal entry at t = 1. Similarly,
if k = 0 laissez faire results in optimal entry/exit at t = 2. Thus, it is the duplication of sunk
costs that leads to overentry in the text.
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Our first proposition summarizes the main conclusions for laissez-faire.
Proposition 1 Laissez faire leads to excessive entry at t = 1: nˆ1(0) > nopt1 ; and,
provided θ > δ + Ω, there is is an excessive number of firms in the laissez-faire
steady state (n∗m(0) > n∗opt).
For n1 > 1, laissez-faire leads to excessive first-mover entry and to too many
licences in the steady state because each entrepreneur fails to take into account
that he or she is sinking costs for learning to an extent that is unnecessary from a
social point of view.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of the licence fee on the market solution; that is,
we compare the equilibrium for f = 0 with that for f > 0. The eﬀects are shown
in Figure 3, where the zero-licence fee case is shown by the broken line, and the
positive-licence fee case is shown by the thick line. From (23), dnˆ1/df < 0, while
from (20), a greater f is associated with a lower n2 for θ ∈ (θc, 2Θ]; also, from
(17) and (19), dθb/df < 0 and dθc/df < 0, respectively. However, from (18), if
θ < θb, n2 is independent of the value of f : within this range of θ, n2 < n1 and so
the value of n1 (which does depend on f) is irrelevant, and for firms making the
decision about whether to stay in the industry at t = 2, f is a by-gone. This gives
our the next lemma.
[Figure 3]
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Lemma 2 A positive licence fee reduces the number of first movers and, for θ >
θb(nˆ1), reduces the steady-state number of firms.
Since laissez faire is associated with excessive entry, the introduction of a pos-
itive licence fee can raise welfare.9 The level of f that maximizes social welfare,
subject to the constraint that entry is unregulated, can be derived, but the formula
is not simple enough to yield clear insights.10 However, as f is raised past this
optimal level, welfare falls along with entry.
5 Delay and Speculation
In the formulation above, the licence fee f plays almost the same role as the
learning cost k, the only diﬀerence being that while all firms pay the same fee,
the existence of a spillover causes second movers, though not first movers, to pay
only a portion of k. We now suppose, however, that there is a one-period delay
between paying the licence fee and getting the licence. Thus, we suppose that first
movers pay the licence fee at t = 0 and begin production at t = 1. As above, the
realization of θ is observed between t = 1 and t = 2. With this amendment to the
model, one possibility is for other firms to wait to observe the realization of θ and
then, if the realization is favourable, pay the fee f immediately. Thus, f would be
9 However, if k = 0 the introduction of a licence fee necessarily reduces welfare.
10 It is found that social optimal value of f satisfies£
2Θ(Θ+ k + f − Ω) + σ(1− σ)K2/2− nˆ1Ω
¤
dnˆ1/df − 2nˆ1Θ = 0.
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paid at the beginning of t = 2 and then entry by second movers would occur at
the beginning of t = 3, with the learning cost (1− γ)k then being incurred.
However, entry may take a diﬀerent form. An entrepreneur may decide to
‘speculate,’ applying for a licence, but not producing before the realization of θ,
and then only going into production if the realization is suﬃciently favourable.
Thus, the entrepreneur may pay the fee at the beginning of t = 1, and then either
begin production at the beginning of t = 2 or not begin production at all. We
can therefore now distinguish three types of entry: by first movers, by speculators
and by ‘later movers’ (entrepreneurs who wait to see the realization of θ before
possibly paying f).
At t = 2 a first mover has a cost advantage (1−γ)k over a speculator, and so, if
a speculator enters, we know that all first movers are remaining in the industry. At
t = 2 and t = 3 a speculator has the cost advantages of f and (1−γ)k over a later
mover, and so, if any later movers enter, we know that all speculators are staying
in. To solve the model, we begin by disregarding later movers entirely, considering
only first movers and speculators. (We shall then show that no entrepreneurs will
choose to be later movers.)
Suppose that s1 entrepreneurs buy licences at t = 1. For any one of these
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speculators, h, if he or she then enters at t = 2, profit is
πh2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1− γ)k;
πht = θ − δ − Ωn3, t = 3, 4, ... (26)
And, at t = 2, the present value of its profit stream is
V h2 = θ − δ − Ωn2 − (1− γ)k +
σ
1− σ (θ − δ − Ωn3) . (27)
The number of speculators that then enter at t = 2 depends on what realization
of θ occurs. The realizations can be divided into three cases.
Case (SA) If θ is low enough, V h2 < 0 for all h ∈ (n1, n1 + s1], so that none of
the speculators enter. Since, at t = 2, a speculator has a cost disadvantage relative
to a first-mover, the highest value of θ at which this case obtains is when all n1
first movers would nonetheless remain in the industry. Hence, Case (SA) is defined
by writing n2 = n3 = n1 in (27) and finding the values of θ for which V h2 < 0, i.e.,
θ < δ + Ωn1 + (1− σ)(1− γ)k ≡ θSA(n1). (28)
Case (SB) In this range (28) is violated, and some, but not all, s1 speculators
enter. If all speculators were to enter, the least eﬃcient would make a loss in
22
present value terms; i.e., from (27),
θ < δ + Ω(n1 + s1) + (1− σ)(1− γ)k ≡ θSB(n1). (29)
The number of firms adjusts such that in (27), V h2 = 0 for h = n2, i.e.,
n2 =
1
Ω [θ − δ − (1− σ)(1− γ)k] ≡ nˆ
s
2. (30)
Case (SC) Here, all s1 speculators enter; i.e., (29) is violated.
Moving back to t = 1, we can now consider the payoﬀ from speculation. The
expected present value for the marginal speculator (the s1-th) is
V s11 (n1 + s1) = −f +
σ
2Θ
Z 2Θ
θSB
·
πn1+s12 (n1 + s1) +
σ
1− σπ
n1+s1
3 (n1 + s1)
¸
dθ.
The first term in [.] is profit including set-up cost (1− γ)k, while the second is the
stream of discounted profits after the set-up cost has been incurred. Hence,
V s11 (n1 + s1) = −f +
σ
Θ(1− σ)
µ
Θ− θSB
2
¶2
. (31)
From (29) and (31), dV s11 (n1 + s1)/ds1 < 0. s1 adjusts such that, in equilibrium,
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V s11 (n1 + s1) = 0, that is, (29) and (31),
n1 + s1 =
1
Ω
(
2Θ− δ − (1− σ)(1− γ)k − 2
·
Θ(1− σ)f
σ
¸ 1
2
)
. (32)
The ranges of θ relevant to the behavior of a first mover follow immediately
from the cases already specified in this and the previous section.
Case (Fa) All first movers exit (and no speculators enter). They do this if
θ < θa, as specified in (16).
Case (Fb) Some, but not all, first movers exit (and no speculators enter). This
occurs if θ ≥ θa, but θ < θb(n1), as specified in (17). Note that since the value
of n1 will now be diﬀerent to the value taken in the absence of delay, the value of
θb(n1) will also diﬀer. n2 is now given by (18).
Case (Fc) All first movers stay in production, but still no speculators enter.
In this case θ ≥ θb(n1), but θ < θSA(n1), where θSA(n1) is given by (28).
Case (Fd) All first movers stay in production and some, but not all, speculators
enter. This occurs if θ ≥ θSA(n1), but θ < θSB(n1), where θSB(n1) is given by
(29). n2 is now given by (30).
Case (Fe) All speculators enter. This happens if θ ≥ θSB(n1), the number of
firms n1 + s1 being given by (32).
Given these ranges, the present value, measured from t = 0, of the expected
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profit stream for the marginal first mover is
V n10 (n1) = −f +
σ
2Θ
Z 2Θ
0
πn11 (n1)dθ +
σ2
1− σ
1
2Θ
·Z θSA
θb
πn12 (n1)dθ +
Z θSB
θSA
πn12 (nˆs2)dθ +
Z 2Θ
θSB
πn12 (n1 + s1)dθ
¸
,
where the profit equations (3) apply, but with f deleted. The first integral covers
profit at t = 1; the others cover profit at t = 2, 3, ... for Cases (Fc-Fe), i.e., when the
realization of θ is large enough for the marginal first mover to stay in production.
We thus find, after substituting from (32) to eliminate s1, that
V n10 (n1) = −(1− σ)f + σ(Θ− δ − Ωn1 − k)−
1
4Θ(1− σ) [σ(1− γ)k]
2
+σ2(1− γ)k
µ
1− δ + Ωn1
2Θ
¶
. (33)
From (33), dV n10 (n1)/dn1 < 0. n1 adjusts so that V n10 (n1) = 0, the solution being
n1 = nˆs1, where, from (33),
nˆs1 =
2Θ− δ
Ω −
4Θ [(Θ+ k) + (1− σ)f/σ] + (1− σ)σ [K − f ]2
2Ω [2Θ+ σ(K − f)] . (34)
We now add the possibility of later entry into the model, while still allowing
for speculation. If entrepreneur j pays at t = 2 for a licence in order to begin
25
production at t = 3, the present value of his or her profit stream is
V j2 =
σ
1− σ (θ − δ − Ωn2)− σ(1− γ)k − f . (35)
This parallels equation (5), but incorporates additional discounting because of the
time lag in receiving the licence. If θ were to be suﬃciently high for such late
entry to occur, an interior solution for the number of firms n3 at t = 3 would be
characterized by V n32 = 0; and hence,
n3 =
1
Ω
½
θ − δ − (1− σ)
·
(1− γ)k + fσ
¸¾
. (36)
However, n3 is the total number of firms in this case; that is, it includes the
first movers and speculators, as well as later movers. Now compare (36) with
(30), which gives the total number of firms in Case (SB), i.e., when the marginal
speculator does not enter, though some speculators do. Because of the appearance
of the term f/σ, n3 in (36) is less than n2 in (30). But when there is any late entry,
our assumptions imply that all first movers have stayed in and all speculators have
entered. Thus, the total number of first movers and speculators must be at least
as large as in (30). We have a contradiction: (36) could only apply if the number
of later movers were negative. The following lemma therefore obtains.11
11 The arguments in this section are based on licence delays when a positive fee exists. In the
absence of a fee f all firms would procure a licence at t = 0 and we would eﬀectively be back in
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Lemma 3 With a positive licence fee, if it is necessary to wait to be granted a
licence, there is no later entry.
The up-front payment of the entry fee by speculators gives them a strategic
advantage over later entrants. We can therefore disregard the possibility of later
entry when there is a delay in being granted a licence. The pattern of entry is
as depicted in Figure 4, where ns1(f) is period-1 entry in the delay-case. The
pattern in Figure 4 has the same general shape as that in Figure 2, except in
one important respect. For θ ∈ [θSB(n1), 2Θ], the line depicting the steady-state
number of firms n∗ is horizontal. This is because, for such high realizations of θ,
all the entrepreneurs that have speculatively bought a licence will enter, and, as
we have seen, the solution to the model is such that there is no entry by later
movers.
[Figure 4]
Finally, for f > 0, we compare the solutions with and without delay. Given
Lemma 3, we compare (34) with (23) to obtain the following result for first movers.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value f = f¯(σ) such that nˆs1 R nˆ1 as f Q
f¯(σ); i.e., for f < f¯(σ) licence delay increases first-mover entry, and vice versa.
Proof. From (23) and (34), using (6), we obtain 2Ω(2Θ + σK)[2Θ + σ(K −
f)](nˆs1 − nˆ1)/f = A−B, where A = 2Θ[2Θ(4σ − 2− σ2)/σ − 2σγk + σ(1− σ)(1
the laissez-faire solution.
27
−γ)k] and B = (1 − σ)K[(2 − σ)2Θ − σ2(1 − γ)k]. Using (15), B > 0. Hence,
using (6), we obtain nˆs1 − nˆ1 R 0 as f Q f¯(σ), where f¯(σ) ≡
{4Θ [Θ(4σ − 2− σ2)/σ − σγk − (1− σ)2(1− γ)]k] + (1− σ)[σ(1− γ)k]2} /B
Delay benefits first movers in that potential competitors (speculators) pay the
fee for a licence that they may not use, and this limits their expected profit. But
the cost to the potential first mover is that it must itself wait, after payment for
the licence, before entry is possible. Because of the latter eﬀect, we find that delay
induces greater first-mover entry only if f is suﬃciently small. Indeed, we cannot
rule out the possibility that f¯(σ) < 0, in which case licence delay necessarily causes
smaller first-mover entry.
Denoting the steady-state number of firms in the presence of licence delay by
n∗m(f), we can compare this with the corresponding number n∗m(f) without delay.
The relative size of these numbers depends on the realization of θ and on parameter
values, but we can make some comments by reference to Figure 4, where both are
shown. Starting from θ = 0, and then increasing θ, the steady state is at first zero
in each case, and then the same upward-sloping lines apply; but then, since we
cannot determine, unconditionally, in which case there is higher first-period entry,
we cannot tell which steady-state number is higher (we cannot tell in which case
the horizontal portion of the steady-state line in Figure 4 is higher; the figure is
merely an illustration). However, for the highest values of θ, provided f is not so
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high as to prevent entry in the no-delay case, n∗m(f) > n∗s(f), as drawn.12
6 Concluding Comments
Entry rates in developing economies are potentially high because numerous oppor-
tunities exist to close the technology gap with developed economies. We explore
these issues in a model in which regulatory barriers that are widely observed in
such economies - licence fees and bureaucratic delay - may in principle prevent
these opportunities from being exploited. We find, however, that, because in this
environment laissez faire leads to ‘excessive’ entry, low levels of regulatory barriers
can in fact increase welfare. As the size of a licence fee is raised from zero, welfare
first increases and then declines. We also note that, although weaker property
rights discourage innovative entry, if they lead to greater spillovers, they can raise
the number of firms in the steady state.
Whereas, in the absence of bureaucratic delay, a licence fee has a negative eﬀect
on both the number of first movers and on the steady-state number of firms, the
combination of bureaucratic delay and a licence fee can have the opposite eﬀects.
This is because, although the time lag between application for and receipt of a
licence is assumed the same for all entrepreneurs, the delay changes the balance
of advantage between first and later movers. Moreover, delay opens up the option
12 It is found that nˆ2 in (20) is greater than n1 + s1 in (32) if 4Θ− σ(1− σ)f > 0.
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of speculative purchase of licences, not all of which are then used.
Empirical work on the impact of entry barriers (e.g., Djankov et al., 2002) has
tended to assume that all barriers have negative eﬀects on entry and that reduced
entry is bad for welfare. Our analysis suggests that both of these views are too
simplistic. There is evidence, however, that where bureaucratic delays are large,
the number of registered firms greatly exceeds the number of active ones (see,
for example, Aidis, 2005, on Russia). Our model provides an explanation of this
observation.
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